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ABSTRACT 
The Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of 
China underwent significant amendments in 2014, the background, 
process, main contents, and preliminary effects of which will be 
examined in this paper.   
Generally speaking, the amendments have made a powerful 
response to issues besetting the judicial review of agency action in 
China, especially the “difficulties in getting an administrative 
lawsuit registered, adjudicating administrative cases, and executing 
court decisions.”  After the amended Administrative Litigation Law 
came into effect, the acceptance of first instance administrative 
lawsuits increased sharply, the plaintiff’s winning rate rose slightly, 
and the reform of the administrative reconsideration and petition 
mechanisms were further advanced.  In my opinion, the 
amendments have achieved the legislators’ desired results, and the 
administrative litigation in China is embracing the best ever period 
in its history.  
However, the deep-seated problems that have troubled 
administrative litigation for years still exist.  Courts’ review of 
normative documents, the collateral review of local regulations, and 
the acceptance of public interest litigation have all been evaded.  
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Furthermore, full independence and authority of administrative 
trials still requires an overall judicial and political reform.  
Consequently, administrative adjudication still faces a difficult path.   
The amendments of the Administrative Litigation Law not only 
reflect the efforts to promote the rule of law in this era, but also 
illustrate the limitations of the process under the rule of law in 
China at this stage.    
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The Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (hereinafter referred to as the “Law”) underwent 
significant amendments for the past twenty-five years since its 
promulgation in 2014.  It was hoped that the amendments would 
solve difficulties in settling administrative disputes and help 
establish the rule of law in China.  This paper will examine the 
background, courses, main contents and the preliminary effects of 
the amendments.  The author is mainly concerned with the 
following issue: the leading party proclaims that this era seeks to 
“promote the rule of law in an all-round manner,” but how much 
progress may the amendments bring to China’s legal system 
construction? 
 
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LITIGATION LAW AMENDMENTS 
A. The Symbol of Democracy and the Rule of Law 
 The current administrative litigation system in China was 
established by the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (the “1989 
Law”).  The 1989 Law was adopted by China’s highest institution 
of state power—the National People’s Congress (hereinafter 
referred to as the “NPC”) on the eve of the “Tiananmen Incident,” 
and was scheduled to take effect in October 1990—a year and a half 
later.  It is not common to deliberate and adopt a law by a group of 
nearly 3000 deputies in China; in fact, it is rare to spend one and a 
half years on preparing for a legislation.  This is a sign of this 
country’s grave and arduous transition to a modern governance 
system. 
 The Law allows citizens and organizations to file a 
complaint against the peoples’ government or its divisions regarding 
their action or inaction in the peoples’ courts at different levels, with 
the latter hearing the case.  It is a totally new attempt in China’s 
traditional bureaucracy and contemporary party-state system that an 
independent judicial body, instead of the administrative agency’s 
superior, examines the action of the agency concerned.  Fully aware 
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of the impacts and difficulties in the implementation of the Law, the 
Legislators were cautious and granted a relatively limited power to 
courts in the Law.  Citizens may litigate against specific 
administrative decisions, but may not file a lawsuit against generally 
applicable normative documents.  Courts may only judge the 
legality of administrative action according to laws and regulations 
and may not review with principle administrative discretion, nor 
could courts review the constitutionality of laws and regulations.   
 The promulgation of the Law has been deemed from the 
beginning as a significant event in the construction of democracy 
and rule of law in China.  The government and academic circles 
have held activities to mark the fifth, the tenth and twentieth 
anniversary of the Law’s promulgation, and the mass media has 
widely publicized in celebration of the law.  Courts nationwide have 
accepted and concluded more than 2.1 million administrative 
lawsuits by 2014.  By a rough estimate, one-fourth of the plaintiffs 
had got some sort of relief through litigation.  Administrative 
litigation has also helped increase the awareness of administration 
by law and promoted the perfection of the administrative law 
system.  Without administrative litigation, many of the plaintiffs 
would have been still running on the road to petition, and many of 
the officials would not have heard of terms such as “excess of 
power” or “due process.”  “The significance of The Law can never 
be overstated,”1 said Professor Ying Songnian (应松年), who has 
been involved in drafting the Law.   
 
B. Predicaments of Administrative Litigation 
 Nevertheless, the implementation of the Law has proved to 
be unusually difficult.  Ordinary people described administrative 
                                                             
1 Ying Songnian (应松年), Zhongguo Xingzhengfa de Chuangzhi yu Mianlin 
de Wenti (中国行政法的创制与面临的问题) [The Making and Problems of 
Chinese Administrative Law], 1 Jianghai ACAD. J (2001). For more discussion, see 
Ying Songnian, Yu Fa Tong Xing (与法同行：应松年口述) [WALK WITH LAW: 
YING SONGNIAN’S NARRATION] (China Univ. Political Sci. & Law Press 2016), at 
107, 183 (discussing the Law and its repercussions). 
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litigation as “hurling an egg against a rock,” judges mocked 
themselves as “living in the crevice,” and scholars’ descriptions 
were filled with words such as “hardship” and “predicament.”2  
Prior to the amendments of the Law, the National People’s Congress 
Legislative Affairs Commission (hereinafter referred as the 
“Commission”) summarized in its survey report the predicaments of 
administrative litigation as a “difficulty in getting an administrative 
lawsuit registered, a difficulty in adjudicating administrative cases, 
plus a difficulty in executing court decisions.”3  The “Three 
Difficulties” were widely accepted and set the tone for future 
legislation.   
 
1. The Difficulty in Getting an Administrative Lawsuit 
Registered 
                                                             
2 For a comprehensive investigation of the situation, see generally Gong 
Xiangrui (龚祥瑞), IDEAL AND REALITY OF THE RULE OF LAW: REPORT ON THE 
ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LITIGATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (法治的理想与现实) 
(China Univ. Political Sci. & Law Press 1993); Lin Lihong (林莉红), IDEAL AND 
REALITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE OF LAW: REPORT ON THE EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW 
(行政法治的理想与现实) (Peking Univ. Press 2014) (each describing the 
implementation of the Law). For discussion in English journals, see generally 
Susan Finder, Like Throwing an Egg against a Stone: Administrative Litigation in 
the People's Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 1 (1989) (discussing the history 
of administrative litigation in China and analyzing the provisions of the 
Administrative Litigation Law ); Pei Minxin, Citizens vs. Mandarins: 
Administrative Litigation in China, 152 CHINA Q. 832 (1997) (examining the 
patterns of administrative litigation after the enactment of the Administrative 
Litigation Law and evaluating the effectiveness of the Law’s implementation); 
Kevin O’Brien & Li Lianjiang, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in 
Rural China, 51 CHINA J. 75 (2004) (relating the implementation of the Law in 
rural China); He Haibo, Litigations without a Ruling: The Predicaments of 
Administrative Law in China, 3 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 257 (2011) (focusing on 
the administrative implementations and repercussions of the Law).  
3 Xin Chunying (信春鹰), Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng 
Susong Fa Xiuzhengan Cao’an de Shuoming (关于中华人民共和国行政诉讼法
修正案草案的说明) [Explanations on the Amendment of the Administrative 
Litigation Law of the PRC], the Sixth Plenary Session of the 12th Standing 
Committee of the NPC on Dec. 23, 2013. 
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 The most prominent problem in implementing the Law is the 
difficulty in getting an administrative lawsuit registered.  Lawsuits 
of sensitive areas relating to birth control (early stage), land 
expropriation and house removal, town planning and illegally-built 
structure demolition, and business shut-down, where there were 
intensive disputes and frequent mass incidents, were found 
especially difficult to enter litigation.  Some courts simply did not 
accept any such cases.  “The work in our division is to battle against 
the ordinary people with wits and courage,” said a judge of the 
lawsuit-registration division who does not wish to give out his 
name, “and to make every attempt to not register the lawsuit.”  A 
chief judge of a High People’s Court administrative division 
estimated that, in his jurisdictional area, about one-third of all the 
lawsuits filed with the courts were accepted.  Because a large 
number of lawsuits were rejected by the courts and could not be 
resolved through litigation, those people concerned had to turn to 
petitioning.  According to Professor Yu Jianrong’s 2004 survey, 401 
out of 632 farmers who went to Beijing for petitions had filed a 
lawsuit about their problems with the local court before they turned 
to petitioning; 172 lawsuits were rejected by the court, accounting 
for forty-three percent of the total.4  The lawsuits the courts rejected 
were mainly government-involved disputes.   
 The difficulty in getting an administrative lawsuit registered 
was shown statistically by the small number of administrative cases.  
In 2014, 141,880 administrative cases of first instance were 
accepted by the courts nationwide, which created a historical record 
before the Law was amended.5 But what did the number suggest?  It 
represents a fractional ratio of one administrative case for around 
                                                             
4 Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), Zhongguo Xinfang Zhidu de Kunjing he Chulu (中国
信访制度的困境和出路) [Plight of China’s Petitioning System and Way out], 1 
STRATEGY & MGMT. (2009). 
5 The statistic here and the ones below on administrative litigation, unless 
otherwise stated, have been provided by the Supreme People’s Court Research 
Office Statistics Division. Some of them may be found in the Law Yearbook of 
China (中国法律年鉴) of respective year. Readers may also see the relative parts 
of He Haibo’ Administrative Litigation Law (Law Press China 2016). 
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ten thousand people, and fewer than forty administrative cases for a 
court on average.  Many courts accepted and heard fewer than ten 
administrative cases throughout a year.  Among the nine million 
various cases of first instance accepted and heard by the courts 
nationwide, only 1.5 percent were administrative cases.   Compared 
with 4-6 million petitions arising from administrative disputes to the 
Bureau for Letters and Visits at various level per year, 
administrative cases were almost trivial.6   Compared with other 
countries, there were surprisingly fewer administrative cases in 
China.  France has only a population of sixty million, equal to that 
of the seventh largest province in China, but French local 
administrative courts heard 190 thousand cases a year, which is 
more than that by the total of Chinese courts.7  Given the fact that in 
China, administrative dispute resolution is not required in principle 
to “exhaust administrative remedies,” and disputes handled (not 
solved) through administrative reconsideration are no more than the 
ones through administrative litigation, 140 thousand cases in a year 
is really a small number. 
 
2. Difficulty in Adjudicating Administrative Cases  
 The difficulty in adjudicating administrative cases was at 
first manifested when only a fraction of administrative cases were 
closed with judgement.  In previous years before the amendments, 
the courts only closed fewer than thirty percent of the administrative 
cases with judgment, which was even lower than that of civil cases.  
Where were the remaining cases then?  The courts had actually 
found various reasons to dismiss the lawsuits instead of entering 
substantive judgment. A substantial number of cases, with fifteen 
percent in a year at its utmost before the law’s amendment, were 
simply dismissed by the court.  More cases ended because the courts 
                                                             
6 Sun Qian (孙乾), Min Gao Guan Xinfang Anjian Nian Chao 400 Wan Jian 
(“民告官”信访案件年超400万件)[Citizen v. Official Type Petitions Over 4 
Million per Year], Beijing Times, Nov.5, 2014, p.3. 
7 THE CONSEIL D'ÉTAT, http://english.conseil-etat.fr/Judging 
[https://perma.cc/9CMC-RFDQ] (last visited Dec. 18, 2016). 
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have tried to persuade the plaintiffs to withdraw.  The withdrawal 
rate has never been lower than thirty percent since after the Law 
became effective, and the highest one reached fifty-seven percent.  
The low rate of judgement stemmed partly from the authority’s 
efforts to advocate a judicial policy of coordination and 
reconciliation.  But the main reason was that the courts did not have 
strong political and legal backing and they were unable to render a 
fair judgment according to law.8   
 Another manifestation of the difficulty in adjudicating 
administrative cases was the low rate of plaintiffs’ win by court 
adjudication and the consequently high appeal and petition rates.  
Plaintiff first instance winning rate dropped all the way from twenty 
percent when the Law was first implemented to eight percent in 
years before the amendments.  Almost eighty percent of the parties 
of all cases closed by judgement would appeal against the court 
judgment.  Ninety percent of the appellants were plaintiffs, and 
agencies only accounted for five percent.  The bias at the first trial 
can be seen at a glance.  One may assume that courts of the second 
instance might handle the appeals more in favor of the citizens.  
However, only less than ten percent was favorable to the appellants 
and seventy percent to eighty percent was favorable to the appellees.  
Putting them together, only one out of ten citizens won by judgment 
at the first and second instances.  Due to the low winning rate at the 
first and second instances, the rate of petition to a further higher 
court of administrative cases was several times higher than that of 
civil cases.  
 Evidently, the low winning rate of citizens could not be 
ascribed to good law enforcement by agencies.  According to a 
judge who is unwilling to reveal his identity, administrative actions 
filed with the court were mostly questionable, and half of them 
should have been revoked (but the judge did not do so).  The courts 
in Taizhou, Zhejiang Province, once executed cross-regional 
jurisdiction, namely, to transfer cases against agencies of County A 
                                                             
8 He Haibo, supra note 2.  
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to the court in County B for trial, and those against agencies of 
County B to the court in County C.  The one year’s result showed 
that the government’s losing rate reached 62.5 percent.9  Beginning 
in July 2014, all the courts in Henan Province executed cross-
regional jurisdiction across the whole province and the one-year 
result showed that the government’s losing rate reached 28.6 
percent, 18 percent higher than that before the cross-regional 
jurisdiction was practiced.10  As cross-regional jurisdiction was less 
subject to administrative interference, the losing rate of Taizhou and 
Henan seemed to be more reflective of the actual level of 
administrative law enforcement and the potential level that judicial 
review in China should have reached. 
 The third manifestation of the difficulty in adjudicating an 
administrative case was that citizens rarely won a case in the real 
                                                             
9 Sun Wenying (孙文鹰) & Huang Xian’an (黄献安), Xingzheng Anjian Yidi 
Shenpan: “Chen Chongguan Men” Xianxing Yibu (行政案件异地审判：“陈崇
冠们”先行一步) [Cross-Regional Trial of Administrative Cases, Chen 
Chongguan and His Colleagues One Step Ahead], PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY (Feb. 
5, 2004), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2004/02/id/103160.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/W2VW-2TQ3] (summarizing cases that stimulated the Chief 
Justice of Zhejiang Intermediate People’s Court Administrative Tribunal, Chen 
Chongguan, to implement the mode of remote cross-regional trials of 
administrative cases and providing statistics of the result).  For more discussion, 
see Zheng Chunyan (郑春燕) & Chen Chongguan (陈崇冠), Guanyu Xingzheng 
Anjian Yidi Jiaocha Shenpan Moshi de Sikao (关于行政案件异地交叉审判模式
的思考), 1 J. OF ZHEJIANG GONGSHANG, (2005) (reflecting on the mode of a 
remote cross-regional trial of administrative cases based on its establishment, 
formalization, and legal theories); ADMIN. TRIBUNAL OF SUPREME PEOPLE'S 
COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 105-32 (Law Press 
China, Ser. No. 4. 2007) (providing a report on administrative cases of cross-
jurisdiction in Zhejiang Province); He Cailin (何才林), Jiafeng Zhong de Biange 
(夹缝中的变革), 10 PEKING U. L. REV. (2009) (discussing the outcomes of cross-
regional jurisdiction reform in certain courts).  
10 Shi Yan (时岩), Henan Min Gao Guan An Yidi Guanxia Gaige: Geduan 
Difang Zhengfu Guanxi Wang (河南民告官案异地管辖改革：割断地方政府关
系网) [Reform on Cross-Regional Jurisdiction of Cases against Authorities 
Brought by Ordinary People: Sever Local Government’s Network], PEOPLE’S 
DAILY ONLINE, (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://henan.people.com.cn/n/2015/0811/c356896-25927749.html 
[https://perma.cc/4TAK-6C8A]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/7
[2018] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 147 
sense.  In some cases, the court revoked the administrative action in 
question or ordered the agency to perform its duties.  It seemed that 
citizens had won their cases, but the cases were actually switched 
back to center on administrative procedures.  The litigation would 
probably have to go through the procedures again after the agency at 
issue enters a new decision.  Some extreme case even went over 
many rounds.  Some disputes involved both an administrative action 
and the interests of a third party.  The party concerned had to 
proceed separately with the civil action and administrative litigation.  
Unfortunately, much energy was wasted on many pointless things 
due to the lack of coordination on the courts’ side.  In one extreme 
case, the parties got twenty-eight judgments and rulings of different 
courts in different procedures in ten years but were still on the way 
of petition.11  In such circumstances, a citizen could only get an 
empty win at best, and the dispute had not been really settled.   
 
3. Difficulty in Executing Court Decisions 
 The difficulty in execution was not a common problem in 
the past.  There were not many administrative cases of compulsory 
execution (including cases when a citizen was the obligator).  These 
cases dropped from the highest forty thousand pieces to fewer than 
ten thousand pieces in recent years, accounting for only 4.6 percent 
of administrative cases.  There are even fewer conflicts relating to 
execution on record in statistics, which may suggest that litigants 
increasingly obey the effective court’s judgments and resistance is 
decreasing.  The other reason may be that the court had already 
ruled out some tough cases while they put cases on file and 
considered subsequent disposition while they adjudicated a case.  
Thus, difficulty in execution was overshadowed by the difficulties 
in case registration and adjudication. 
 Nonetheless, there were still a few difficult cases of 
                                                             
11 Wang Guisong (王贵松), Xingzheng yu Minshi Zhengyi Jiaozhi de Nanti (行
政与民事争议交织的难题) [The Conundrum of Interwoven Cases of Civil 
Action and Administrative Litigation: Reflection from Jiaozuo Real Estate 
Dispute] (Law Press 2005).  
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execution, especially when there was strong resistance from the 
agency.  In FAN Zhanfei v. Department of Land and Resources of 
Shaanxi Province, the plaintiff won a case concerning mining 
license in the High Court.  The losing defendant went so far as to 
hold a multi-department coordination meeting to veto the effective 
court judgment.12  In another extreme case, a court in Hunan 
Province ruled that a Tianjin public security sub-bureau should pay 
five million yuan in compensation but it was still not executed 
twelve years later, even though the Supreme People’s Court 
expressed its concern and the Central Political and Legislative 
Affairs Committee of the Communist Party sent a letter.13  Although 
such phenomenon is not common, it actually serves as a touchstone 
which reflects the incompetency of the judiciary and helplessness in 
the face of resistance.  Such phenomenon has aggravated the 
public’s impression that the court is useless and further dampen the 
parties’ confidence in administrative litigation. 
 
C. The Law is in “Urgent Need of Amendment” 
 Judges have long known the problems in implementing the 
                                                             
12 Wang Wenzhi (王文志) & Xiao Bo (肖波), Shan Guotuting Fou le Fayuan 
Panjue (陕西国土厅否了法院判决) [Department of Land and Resources of 
Shaanxi Province Vetoed the Court Judgment and Intensified the Ming Right 
Dispute], THE ECON. OBSERVER (July 19, 2010), 
http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/yw/2010-07/19/content_238609.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2AHW-GVL2]; Zhao Lei (赵蕾), Shannxi Guotuting Foujue 
Fayuan Panjue Shiya Zuigaoyuan Yaoqiu Gaipan (陕西国土厅否决法院判决 施
压最高院要求改判) [Department of Land and Resources of Shaanxi Province 
Vetoed the Court Judgment and Pressed the Supreme People’s Court to Amend the 
Judgment], SOUTHERN WKLY. (Aug. 5, 2010). 
13 Wu Yi (吴意),Zhixing Nan, Nan Yu Shang Qingtian?  (执行难，难于上青
天？) [It is Easier to Climb to Heaven than to Execute a Judgement]. 10 CHINESE 
LAWYER (2007); He Xin (贺信), Panpei 500 Wan Gonganju 12 Nian Bu Zhixing 
Xingzheng Panjue Zhixing Nan Beihou de Kunjing (判赔500万公安局12年不执
行 行政判决执行难背后的困境) [The Court Ruled that Tianjin Tanggu Public 
Security Sub-bureau Should Pay 5 Million Yuan Compensation But the Sub-
bureau has not Executed It 12 Years Later]. NANFANG METROPOLIS DAILY (Apr. 
24, 2008), http://www.360doc.com/content/08/0428/14/142_1220805.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/B4BT-2B4R]. 
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Law.  The court has made a great effort to settle the predicaments.  
However, judicial efforts are subject to the restrictions of the Law 
and, consequently, amending the Law is inevitable.  
 At first, judges have overcome some deficiencies of the 
Law’s existing rules through an innovative interpretation of them.  
For instance, the court has attempted to break through the original 
restrictions on personal right and property right and incorporated the 
right to education and “other legitimate rights” into litigation so that 
the scope of administrative litigation could be expanded.14  The 
court may on the basis of the “due process principle” revoke 
administrative actions so as to strengthen review of the legality of 
administrative actions, although legislation does not explicitly 
provide for administrative procedures.15  If an agency does not, 
when it takes an administrative action, inform the interested party of 
the content or the relief approach and application deadline, the 
plaintiff shall be granted an extended time limit (beyond the 
statutory time limit of three months) for filing his complaint.  These 
judicial innovations were altogether embodied in the “Ninety-eight 
Provisions of Judicial Interpretation” issued in 2000.16  They show 
                                                             
14 He Haibo (何海波), Xingzheng Susong Shouan Fanwei: Yiye Sifa Quan de 
Shijian Shi (1990-2000) (行政诉讼受案范围：一页司法权的实践史 (1990-
2000)) [Expanding the Scope of Administrative Litigation: One Page History of 
Judicial Practice 1990 – 2000], 4 PEKING U. L. REV. (Ser. No. 2, 2002); Thomas 
Kellogg, “Courageous Explorers”?: Education Litigation and Judicial 
Innovation in China, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 141 (2007). 
15 He Haibo, The Dawn of the Due Process Principle in China, 22 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 57–118 (2008). 
16 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zhixing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Xingzheng Susong Fa Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于执行中华人
民共和国行政诉讼法若干问题的解释) [The Supreme People’s Court Judicial 
Interpretation of Several Issues Relating to the Implementation of the 
Administrative Litigation Law of the PR] (2000), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/lfzt/2014/2013-12/20/content_1817962.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7KVS-VAHX]; see Jiang Bixin (江必新), The Contribution of 
Judicial Interpretation to the Development of Administrative Law Theories (司法
解释对行政理论法学的发展), 4 CHINA LEGAL SCI. 36 (2001) (analyzing the 
effect of People’s Supreme Court’s explanation on several issues regarding the 
execution of the Administrative Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of 
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the potentials of a dynamic judicial system even in the case of 
limited judicial authority.  Nevertheless, judges cannot ignore the 
legal restrictions in their innovations and such innovations by a few 
bold judges cannot represent the general practice. 
 In addition, judges have tried other methods to flexibly 
handle administrative cases to ease the difficulties in getting an 
administrative lawsuit registered and adjudicating administrative 
cases.  For instance, some courts experimented on a “round table 
trial” to avoid the rigidness of traditional court setting.  Specifically, 
the plaintiff, the defendant and the judge are all seated at one table 
and talk and negotiate in a civil manner.17  Some courts, considering 
potential dilemmas after a case is registered, conducted “pre-action 
mediation.”  Namely, the court first mediates between the two 
parties before registering the lawsuit brought by the plaintiff.  If 
both parties accept the mediation, the court will not need to put the 
case on file (even if the mediation fails).  Coordination is the most 
widely used by the court to persuade plaintiffs to withdraw.  
Because the Law prohibits mediation, judges renamed their practice 
as “coordination,” which is actually disguised mediation.  
Coordination has long been used extensively in administrative 
litigation.  Judges even consider it for some time as a “new mode” 
of administrative trial under the influence of official documents.  
However, such measures are simply reluctant choices of judges who 
cannot decide cases according to law.  These measures fail to 
substantially benefit plaintiffs in most cases.18   
 What’s more, many courts actively approach local Party 
Committees and governments and closely follow the “central task” 
of the locality for the purpose of obtaining the above two’s support 
to administrative trials.  As a proverb puts it, “help but do not cause 
                                                                                                                                           
China). 
17 Zheng Chunsun (郑春笋), Min Gao Guan An Yuanzhuo Shen Xieshang 
Duihua Hao Kuansong (民告官案圆桌审 协商对话好宽松), LEGAL DAILY (July 
24, 2008), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2008-
07/24/content_908113.htm?node=10.  
18 He Haibo, supra note 2, at 257. 
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troubles.”  A grassroots administrative division chief judge, who has 
been awarded the title of Outstanding Individual of National 
Administrative Trial but who does not wish to disclose his name 
here, explained to me his trade-off theory: the court will give 
unconditional support to the administrative action concerning the 
local government’s “central task,” and for the rest of administrative 
cases, the local government should respect the court and be 
supportive.  Such an approach sacrifices judicial independence, 
violates the principle of the rule of law, and radically undermines 
judicial status and authority.   
Although the court has made various efforts, administrative 
litigation is still in straitened circumstances and is unable to get rid 
of the predicaments.  Chief Judge Zhao Daguang (赵大光) of the 
Supreme People’s Court Administrative Division appealed loudly at 
the 2014 Annual Administrative Law Conference that the 
administrative litigation system had come to a “dead end” and must 
be amended.19  The court system’s insignificant legal and political 
power further increased the necessity of the amendment.  
 
II. COURSE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION 
LAW AMENDMENT 
 
A. Start-up 
 The legislature has noticed the demand for amending the 
Law in an early time.  The Standing Committee of the NPC 
included this item in the five-year legislative schedules in 2003 as a 
program to “discuss, prepare a draft and arrange for deliberation at 
due time.”  The Standing Committee included it again in the five-
year legislative schedules in 2008 as “a draft bill to be submitted for 
deliberation within its term of office.”20  But it would not be 
                                                             
19 August 23, 2014, Zhengzhou City, Henan Province. 
20 Legislative Schedule of the Tenth National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee  (十届全国人大常委会立法规划), PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Dec.18, 
2003), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/14957/2252949.html 
[https://perma.cc/2W2V-FPUN]; Legislative Schedule of the Eleventh National 
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arranged for deliberation until the next NPC Standing Committee 
holds its session.  The Law, enacted in 1989 and remained 
untouched since, is almost the oldest law in contemporary China 
where the legal system is going through rapid development and 
frequent revisions.  In comparison, the Civil Procedure Law and the 
Criminal Procedure Law have undergone respectively two major 
amendments since that period.   
 Whether it is the right time for legislation is much related to 
the political climate.  The Law was adopted exactly along with the 
upsurge of political reforms in the 1980s.  It is hard to imagine the 
enactment of the Law without that trend.  Afterwards, the political 
reform receded to a low ebb, and it was very difficult to put major 
reforms on the agenda.  On the technical level, the Supreme 
People’s Court itself can perfect the Law (and it has frequently done 
so), but no real improvement at the system level can be made unless 
there is a resolution from the top political authority.  None of the 
major issues involved in the administrative litigation system, such 
as incorporating normative documents into the scope of 
administrative litigation, raising the level of trial courts on a large 
scale or excluding local government’s interference with court trials, 
will concern the adjustment between judicature and administration 
and the Party Committee.  None of these issues will be tackled 
without the resolution of the top political authority.   
 It is not always a good time for a legal reform.  There was an 
obvious “regression” after 2006 in the Chinese political and legal 
system under the control of Zhou Yongkang (周永康), who was 
later sentenced for corruption.  Instead of underlining the court’s 
                                                                                                                                           
People’s Congress Standing Committee  (十一届全国人大常委会立法规划), the 
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/2008-
10/29/content_1455985.htm [https://perma.cc/2A3X-XJ4M]. For more 
information of legislative plan, see Kan Ke (阚珂), Look back on the NPC 
Standing Committee’s Legislative Planning Work (回望全国人大常委会的立法
规划工作), NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/lfdt/2013-11/07/content_1812837.htm 
[https://perma.cc/56YT-2NM8] (describing the NPC Standing Committee’s 
legislative planning work). 
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independence in trial, officials at each level demanded an adherence 
to “absolute leadership of the Party;” instead of underlining trial 
according to law, they chased a “unity of three effects” (i.e., 
political effect, social effect, and legal effect); instead of demanding 
the court to adjudicate cases decisively, they demanded the court to 
do “grand mediation” and “grand reception of petitions”.21  It was 
doubtful during that time that an amendment of law would achieve 
the desired effect.  An official of the Legislative Affairs Commission 
stated at a meeting in early 2009 that amendments should touch 
major issues and facilitate the improvement of the system.  But if it 
was not done correctly, effectuating the amendments might lead to 
regression.22  Some judges and scholars were also concerned about 
the bad timing for amending the Law, which might not result in a 
positive effect.   
 After the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China, the leadership redressed the deviation, and “rule of law” and 
“judicial reform” became hot topics again.  Amending the Law was 
really put on the agenda this time.  In November 2013, the Third 
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC proposed 
to build the rule of law in China, announcing the goal to make the 
masses feel fair and just in every judicial case.  In October 2014, the 
last critical moment for amending the Law, the Fourth Plenary 
Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC released a signal 
of “comprehensive promotion of the rule of law” and put forward a 
number of measures relating to the administrative litigation system.  
Among the highlights were “to perfect the system and mechanisms 
of administrative litigation, to moderately adjust the administrative 
lawsuit jurisdiction system, to effectively solve the prominent 
problems of difficulties in getting an administrative lawsuit 
registered, adjudicating administrative cases and executing court 
                                                             
21 He Haibo (何海波), Xingzheng Fazhi, Women Haiyou Duo Yuan (行政法
治，我们还有多远？) [Administrative Rule of Law, How Far Away are We from 
It?], 6 TRIB. OF POL. SCI. & L. (2013). 
22 NPC Legislative Affairs Comm’n, Forum on Administrative Litigation Law 
at Henan Hotel in Beijing (Jan.21, 2009). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
154 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 13] 
decisions,” “to improve the rules on agency’s appearance in court, 
to support the court to accept and hear administrative cases, and to 
respect and execute effective court decisions.”23  That, under the 
party-state system, can be deemed as the political determination and 
supreme authorization for amending the Law.  
 Compared to the past, the time for amending the Law could 
not be any better.   
 
B. Participating Parties 
 The amendment of the Law, as a typical process of 
legislation and with the NPC Standing Committee as the center, 
involved many parties.   
 
1. Legislative Affairs Commission 
 At the NPC level, the Legislative Affairs Commission is 
mainly responsible for the amendment of the Law.  This 
Commission consists of nearly 200 legislative experts who are 
responsible for drawing up major draft bills, and since 2007 the 
whole process of legislative work includes the overall planning, 
organization, coordination, guidance and service.  There are about 
one dozen experts in the Administrative Law Office of the 
Commission who are responsible for major administrative 
legislation.  This Office has drafted basic laws, including the 
Administrative Penalty Law, the Administrative Licensing Law, and 
the Administrative Coercion Law, and has completed the 
amendments of a series of important laws including the 
Environmental Protection Law.  
 Compared with other state institutions (including the court), 
the Commission is in a more detached position and the experts have 
                                                             
23 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin Yifa Zhiguo Ruogan 
Zhongda Wenti de Jueding (中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的
决定) [Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on a Number of Major 
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law], adopted at the 
Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC on Oct. 23, 
2014.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/7
[2018] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 155 
a better understanding of the actual situation of the administrative 
litigation.  But after all, this Commission does not have formal 
legislative power and thus cannot decide major issues.  It is at best a 
coordinator of the opinions of all parties.  The Commission needs to 
first act on the orders of the Central Committee of the CPC and the 
NPC, then coordinate the opinions of the court, the people’s 
procuratorate, the legal affairs office and other departments, and 
listen to the public, the scholars and others in the society.  The 
impacts of its efforts also depend on whether the draft bills it draws 
up can be adopted by a massive majority vote among the 152 NPC 
Standing Committee members.  
 
2. Other State Organs 
 Courts aspire to amend the Law, pay earnest attention to 
amending the Law, and have the closest association with the 
Commission.  Judges have accompanied the Commission officials 
in most of their surveys.  The Supreme People’s Court has drafted 
its version of amendments to the Law and submitted to the 
Commission, and the leading Party group of the Supreme People’s 
Court has twice submitted opinions on specific issues to the 
Commission.24  Compared with scholars’ opinions, the opinions of 
                                                             
24 These opinions are not publicly disclosed.  But one can learn about the 
Supreme People’s Court’s basic standpoint from the work of the Supreme 
People’s Court judges.  See generally Jiang Bixin (江必新) & Cai Xiaoxue (蔡小
雪), ZHONGGUO XINGZHENG SUSONG ZHIDU DE WANSHAN: XINGZHENG SUSONG 
FA XIUGAI WENTI SHIWU YANJIU (中国行政诉讼制度的完善：行政诉讼法修改
问题实务研究) [Perfection of the Chinese Administrative Litigation System: 
Study on the Practice of Administrative Litigation Law Amendments] (Law Press 
China 2005) (analyzing the Administrative Litigation Law through 11 different 
questions); Jiang Bixin (江必新), Wanshan Xingzheng Susong Zhidu de Ruogan 
Sikao (完善行政诉讼制度的若干思考)[Some Thoughts on Perfecting the 
Administrative Litigation System]), 1 CHINA LEGAL SCI., 5 (2013) (discussing 
current practical problems with the Administrative Litigation Law, and providing 
suggestions to amend the Law); Li Guangyu (李广宇), Wang Zhenyu (王振宇) & 
Liang Fengyun (梁凤云), Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiugai Ying Guanzhu Shi Da 
Wenti (行政诉讼法修改应关注十大问题) [Ten Major Issues in the Amendment 
of Administrative Litigation Law], 3 J. L. APPLICATION (2013) (detailing the major 
problems in the amendment to the Administrative Litigation Law).  
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the courts receive more attention.  Judges say in private to the 
Commission officials, “thank you for helping us solve the 
problems,” and the Commission officials would say, “we are a 
family. It’s our pleasure.” Notwithstanding the above, the 
Commission will not take all the demands in the list.   
 The function of the people’s procuratorate is not that 
prominent and its demands are relatively simple.  It expects the Law 
to grant them a more powerful status, to represent the public 
interest, to bring administrative lawsuits alongside the courts, and to 
supervise, as the guardian of law, the whole process of 
administrative litigation.     
 The attitude of the government legal departments appears to 
be comparatively negative.  Although the government makes great 
efforts to build “governance by law,” it is concerned that judicial 
intervention will disturb government agencies’ routine work and 
exceed administration officials’ capacity.  Government law officers 
rarely publish articles, hold discussions, or state their stands in 
public.  But the Commission cannot ignore their attitudes.  The 
Commission needs to persuade the Legal Affairs Office of the State 
Council to accept major institutional changes or at least not to 
strongly oppose the changes.  The provision that reconsideration 
organ shall be the defendant was adopted in the draft bill partly as 
the Legal Affairs Office of the State Council  compromised.  The 
people’s procuratorate failed to represent the public interest and to 
sue against the agency mainly because the objection of the 
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council.   
 
3．The Public, NPC Deputies and Legal Scholars 
 The public is very interested in amending the Law.  The 
NPC Standing Committee published the draft amendments twice to 
solicit public comments and the public showed considerable 
enthusiasm.25  It is reported that that more than 4,000 citizens 
                                                             
25 The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 
Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiuzhengan (Caoan) Tiaowen (行政诉讼法修正案草案条
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nationwide responded with 7,736 pieces of comments in total.26  
Some NPC deputies also offered their opinions one after another.  
These opinions may not be very professional or operational, but 
they reflected the people’s concerns and dissatisfactions with the 
Law.  The public complained about the “difficulty in getting 
administrative lawsuits registered with the court,” that they could 
not “see the defendant agency official in court,” and that the 
reconsideration organ simply sustained the original action, which 
deeply impressed the legislature.  The legislature eventually 
responded to the public complaints. 
 Social organizations in China are underdeveloped.  Legal 
scholars largely act as the spokespersons for public interest and 
consultants of the legislature.  Administrative law scholars have 
been calling for amendments of the Law for years, which was 
frequently reported by the media.  The Chinese Administrative Law 
Society and other academic organizations have held a great number 
of discussions in the course of the amendment.  Several major 
academic institutions have submitted their respective proposed 
amendments.27  Generally speaking, scholars share a highly 
                                                                                                                                           
文) [Administrative Litigation Law Amendment Draft] (Dec. 31, 2013), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/lfzt/2014/2013-12/31/content_1822188.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y6KC-4KP7]; The National People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China, Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiuzhengan (Caoan Erci Shenyi Gao) 
Tiaowen (行政诉讼法修正案草案二次审议稿条文) [Administrative Litigation 
Law Amendment Second Draft] (Sep. 1, 2014), 
http://npc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0901/c14576-25580921.html 
[https://perma.cc/2AXY-LKTG]. 
26 Yijing Jieshu de Zhengqiu Yijian (已经结束的征求意见) [Legislation Drafts 
that Have Closed Up Soliciting Public Comments], THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S 
CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flcazqyj/node_8195_2.htm [https://perma.cc/83HY-
EZ7B] (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
27 Ma Huaide (马怀德), Sifa Gaige yu Xingzheng Susong Zhidu de Wanshan 
(司法改革与行政诉讼制度的完善) [Judicial Reform and Perfection of the 
Administrative Litigation System: Proposed Amendments to the Law and 
Explanations], CHINA U. POL. SCI. & L. PRESS 126 (2004); Hu Jianmiao (胡建淼), 
Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiugai Yanjiu (行政诉讼法修改研究) [Study on Revising 
the Administrative Litigation Law: Proposed Articles and Reasons], ZHEJIANG U. 
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consistent position: more judicial review and more effective dispute 
resolution.  However, legal scholars have been more influential for 
technical issues than policy decisions.  
 As in the course of many other legislations, foreign laws 
were frequently taken as a reference by Legislative Affairs 
Commission officials and scholars.28  Foreign experts from the U.S., 
Germany, Japan and Taiwan were invited to Beijing several times 
for consultation.   
 
C. Three Deliberations 
 In accordance with the Legislation Law of the PRC, a 
legislative bill shall in general be put to vote after three 
deliberations at the sessions of the Standing Committee of the NPC.  
If there is a consensus from various quarters, the bill shall be put to 
vote after two deliberations, or even after one deliberation.  The 
Draft Amendment of the Law has undergone three deliberations, 
which reflects legislators’ prudence.  However, it took less than one 
year for the Draft Amendment to be adopted on November 1, 2014.  
For the amendment of an important law, that was faster than most 
scholars had expected.  
 After three deliberations, the Draft Amendment was changed 
                                                                                                                                           
PRESS 117 (2007); Yang Xiaojun (杨小君), XINGZHENG SUSONG FA WENTI 
YANJIU YU ZHIDU GAIGE (行政诉讼法问题研究与制度改革) [Study on 
Problems of the Administrative Litigation Law and Reform of the System] 
(Chinese People’s Public Security Publishing House 2007); MO XIAOCHUAN (莫
于川), JIANSHE FAZHI ZHENGFU XUYAO SIFA GENG GEILI: XINGZHENG SUSONG FA 
XIUGAI WENTI YANJIU JI ZHUANJIA JIANYI GAO (建设法治政府需要司法更给力: 
行政诉讼法修改问题研究及专家建议稿) [More Effective Judicature Needed to 
Build Rule of Law: Study on the Amending the Administrative Litigation Law 
and Expert Proposals] (Tsinghua University Press 2014); He Haibo (何海波) et 
al., , Lixiang de Xingzheng Susong Fa – Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng 
Susong Fa Xuezhe Jianyi Gao (理想的行政诉讼法--《中华人民共和国行政诉
讼法》学者建议稿) [Ideal Administrative Litigation Law: Scholars’ Proposed 
Draft of the Administrative Litigation Law], 2 ADMIN. L. REV. (2014). 
28 A Chinese translation and compilation of foreign statutes with regard to 
judicial review is on the way of publication. A COMPILATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LITIGATION LAW OF CHINA AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES (He Haibo ed., The 
Commercial Press) (forthcoming). 
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in many places.  This paper will not relate in detail the changes 
made at each deliberation, but will give an overview of the content 
changes.29  This will help the readers understand the value of 
repeated deliberations on a draft bill.  
 Generally speaking, the Legislative Affairs Commission has 
done considerable research before drafting the bill and knows the 
opinions of various quarters.  Thus, the Commission was 
comparatively certain of the goals of the Amendment.  Once the 
Commission completed the Draft Bill, the basic framework of the 
Amendment was therefore determined.  Some scholars previously 
proposed an “overall revision” from the litigation system and 
mechanisms to the wording of the clauses and structure of the code.  
Obviously, that proposal was not accepted.  The Commission’s 
Draft Bill is basically a “moderate revision.”  Nonetheless, new 
suggestions were constantly accepted at the deliberations and the 
Draft Bill had been gradually improved.   
 After the first deliberation by the Standing Committee, the 
Second Draft had several big changes.  “Obviously improper” was 
added to the basis of the judicial review, which gives the court a 
better footing in exercising its reviewing power over administrative 
discretion and a concrete reason to invalidate an unreasonable 
                                                             
29 For more relevant information, please refer to the explanations of all the 
previous deliberations by the NPC Standing Committee. See generally Li Shishi 
(李适时) , REPORT ON THE REVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW OF THE PRC (DRAFT) (关于中华人民共和国
行政诉讼法修正案草案修改情况的汇报),at the Tenth Plenary Session of the 
12th Standing Committee of the NPC on Aug. 25, 2014; Qiao Xiaoyang (乔晓阳), 
REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE DELIBERATIONS ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW OF THE PRC (DRAFT)  (关于中华人民共和国
行政诉讼法修正案草案审议结果的报告) , at the Eleventh Plenary Session of 
the 12th Standing Committee of the NPC on Oct. 27, 2014 ; Qiao Xiaoyang (乔晓
阳), REPORT ON THE OPINIONS ON DRAFT DECISION OF THE NPC STANDING 
COMMITTEE ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW OF 
THE PRC  (《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改〈中华人民共和国行政
诉讼法〉的决定 (草案)》修改意见的汇报), at the Eleventh Plenary Session of 
the 12th Standing Committee of the NPC on Oct. 31, 2014 (explaining several 
opinions on the amendments to the Law). 
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administrative act.  The clause, “The Supreme People’s Court shall 
refer to the State Council for ruling when [the court] thinks the 
administrative rules are inconsistent,” was deleted.  The 
reconsideration organ shall also become the defendant when it 
sustains the administrative action in question.  The Second Draft for 
deliberation also made a minor adjustment to the structure—the 
chapter with the most content, “Trial and Judgment,” was divided 
into five sections, which made it seem better organized.   
 Some major revisions were made to the Draft Bill even at 
the last deliberation.  Social organizations that undertake public 
administration and public service functions under authorization 
were also included as the defendant of an administrative litigation.  
Administrative contract was added to the scope of acceptable 
lawsuit.  It was emphasized that the court should disclose on its own 
initiative legally effective judgments and rulings “for the public 
access.”  Qiao Xiaoyang (乔晓阳), Chairman of the Law Committee 
of the NPC, made a special explanation on these changes just one 
day before the Draft Bill was put to vote.30   
 Some clauses in the Draft Bill have been repeatedly revised.  
For instance, it was provided in the First Draft, “the Higher People’s 
Court may determine a number of grassroots people’s courts’ cross-
administrative-regional jurisdiction over first instance 
administrative cases.”  The Supreme People’s Court and others 
pointed out that cross-administrative-regional jurisdiction over 
administrative cases should not be limited to the grassroots courts 
and the Draft Bill should leave some space for the jurisdiction 
reform.  Therefore, the word “grassroots” was deleted in the Third 
Draft.  The Supreme People’s Court then pointed out in accordance 
with the message of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central 
Committee of the CPC that cross-administrative-regional 
jurisdiction would not be limited to the first instance cases.  Thus, 
the language “first instance” was deleted before the Draft Bill was 
put to vote.   
                                                             
30 Qiao Xiaoyang (乔晓阳), Oct. 31, 2014, supra note 30.  
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 There are also individual clauses that remained the same, 
though they have undergone several proposed changes.  The Law 
provides that the court shall revoke any administrative action that 
violates statutory procedures.  In the First Draft of amendments, the 
language was revised to “violates statutory procedures and may 
have practical impact on the plaintiff’s right.”  Some scholars 
commented that this revision denied the independent value of 
administrative procedure and turned out to be a regression of the 
legislation on administrative procedure.  In the Second Draft, the 
language was revised as “violates statutory procedures and no 
additions and corrections can be made.”  Some scholars worried that 
this would give too much leeway for agencies and as a result make 
the requirements of statutory procedures meaningless.  The Third 
Draft accepted scholars’ opinions, removed the additional limit and 
restored the original expression of the Law.   
 
D.  Passing 
 Under the Chinese legislative system, amendment of laws 
may be conducted by the annual National People’s Congress which 
consists of nearly 3,000 deputies or by the NPC Standing 
Committee, which is much smaller in size and holds meetings more 
frequently.  It may appear to be more solemn when an amendment is 
conducted by the NPC but the amendment will be equally powerful 
in its legal effect.  Moreover, the NPC’s sessions are relatively 
shorter and address more matters.  As a result, it is often difficult to 
put legislative matters on the agenda.  In practice, the vast majority 
of law amendments have been conducted by the Standing 
Committee and only four laws were amended by the NPC itself.31  
                                                             
31 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint 
Ventures (中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法) (promulgated by Nat’l 
People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective July 8, 1979); Electoral Law of the 
People’s Republic of China for the National People’s Congress and Local 
People’s Congresses (中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表
大会选举法) (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective Jan. 
1, 1980); Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民
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Thus, it is not strange at all that the amendment of the 
Administrative Litigation Law was carried out by the Standing 
Committee.  
 The Draft Bill was put to vote after three deliberations at the 
session of the Standing Committee of the NPC.  On November 1, 
2014, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 12th Standing Committee 
of the NPC adopted the decision on the Amendment of the 
Administrative Litigation Law by 152 votes in favor, zero votes 
against and five votes in abstention.  Although the legislature is 
comparatively easy to achieve consensus under the Chinese political 
regime, it is also common to have negative votes.  The result of zero 
negative vote implied that the Amendment had been widely 
recognized by the Standing Committee members who were mostly 
former officials.  This, for the staff of the legislature, was a huge 
success.   
 
III. MAIN CONTENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LITIGATION LAW AMENDMENTS 
 
 After the 2014 amendments, the articles of the 
Administrative Law increased from 75 to 103, out of which 45 are 
revised, 33 are added, 5 are deleted, and only 25 of the original 
provisions remained unchanged.  The Amendment is a relatively big 
revision if one judges purely on the language.  But some clauses 
have only incorporated the previous judicial interpretations of the 
Supreme People’s Court, and some have been revised to make the 
                                                                                                                                           
共和国刑事诉讼法) (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, 
effective January 1, 1980); Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (中
华人民共和国立法法) (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2015, 
effective July 1, 2000).  But several revisions of the above laws were also 
conducted by the Standing Committee of the NPC.  Many other major 
amendments of important laws, such as The Organic Law of Local People’s 
Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the PRC (中华人民共和国地方
各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法), The Criminal Law (中华人民
共和国刑法), and The Civil Procedure Law (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) were 
all conducted by the Standing Committee.  
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expression more precise or concise (e.g., abandon the concept of 
“specific administrative action,” and use the wording 
“administrative action”).  What marks a major amendment of a law 
is not how many provisions have been altered, but how much the 
institution has been improved.  Measured by the improvement of the 
system, this Amendment signaled a remarkable progress, but there 
are still considerable limitations.   
 
A. Measures to Solve “Three Difficulties”    
 As the problems have been identified as “difficulty in getting 
an administrative lawsuit registered, difficulty in adjudicating 
administrative cases, and difficulty in executing court decisions,” 
legislators’ attentions were drawn to these three aspects and their 
efforts were concentrated in solving these difficulties.   
 
1. Measures to Solve “Difficulty in Getting an Administrative 
Lawsuit Registered” 
 The Amendment of the Law makes it a priority to solve the 
difficulty in getting a case registered.  It first sets it as a legal 
principle to register a case according to law, requiring the court to 
protect the right of a citizen to file a complaint and emphasizing that 
agencies must not interfere with the court’s case acceptance.  The 
Amendment also adds a list of the types of actionable administrative 
actions, declaring that several types of difficult administrative cases, 
like land expropriation decisions, shall fall into the scope of case 
acceptance of administrative litigation.  Thirdly and most 
importantly, the pre-registration complaint examination is revised as 
complaint registration.  When the court “is unable to determine on 
the spot whether a complaint meets the conditions for filing a 
complaint as set out by the present law, the court shall receive the 
complaint, issue a written certification bearing the date of receipt, 
and decide whether to register the complaint within seven days.” 32 
Lastly, remedies are set out for plaintiffs when their complaints are 
                                                             
32 Article 51. 
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rejected.  When the court refuses to register a complaint, the 
plaintiff may either appeal the rejection or file his complaint with 
the court at a higher level; if the court rejects the complaint 
materials and gives no written certification, the judge directly in 
charge and other persons directly responsible shall be disciplined.  
With regard to lawsuit registration, the Amendment sets out the 
guideline, the rule and the guarantee.  Its tough tone and severe 
measures are unprecedented in Chinese law.   
 
2. Measures to Solve “Difficulty in Adjudicating 
Administrative Cases” 
 In order to solve the difficulty in adjudicating administrative 
cases, the Amendment has adopted a number of measures.  
 It has first strengthened procedural safeguards.  The agency 
leader is required in principle to appear in court, or at least an 
employee should appear in court; if the leader or an employee of the 
agency refuses to appear in court or if an agency uses illegal means 
such as deceiving or coercing the plaintiff to withdraw his 
complaint, the agency shall be subject to appropriate punishment.  
In the course of a litigation, if the court deems that the execution of 
an administrative action will impair state and public interest or will 
cause irreparable damage to the parties, the court shall rule to 
suspend the execution of the administrative action under challenge.  
The time limit for trial of administrative cases has been extended to 
six months for first instance of trail and three months for second 
instance (originally, three months and two months) and summary 
procedures have been added so as to relieve judges’ caseloads. 
 In the second place, the court is equipped with more 
powerful means of examination.  If an administrative action is 
“obviously improper,” the court shall rule to revoke it.  Previously, 
the court may only exercise very limited review of administrative 
discretion.  An administrative action that just violates statutory 
procedure slightly and does not cause any actual impact to the 
plaintiff’s right shall also be deemed illegal.  When the court deems 
a normative document (a legal document that is not a piece of 
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formal legislation but has universal binding force), on the basis of 
which the administrative action under challenge is taken is illegal, 
the court shall not take the normative document as a legal basis for 
determining the legality of the administrative action in question.  
This point has also been clarified.   
 Thirdly, court decisions can be more flexible and diverse.  
Besides revoking illegal administrative actions, the court may also 
declare administrative actions illegal and order the agency to modify 
its action or to perform what it should do.  If the revocation of an 
administrative action that should be revoked may cause significant 
detriment to state and/or public interest, the court shall refrain from 
revocation and instead declare the administrative action illegal and 
order the agency to take remedial measures.  If an administrative 
action seriously and evidently violates the law, for instance, and the 
action is not taken by a competent administrative institution, the 
court shall declare the administrative action void.  In addition to 
inappropriate administrative punishment, other administrative 
actions involving erroneous determination of the amount of money 
can cause the court to directly enter a judgment to modify the 
administrative actions.  The scope of mediation by the court is 
largely extended: the court may conduct mediation in all cases 
involving administrative discretion, and conclude the cases with 
mediation agreements.  Prior to the Amendment, judges could only 
persuade the plaintiff to withdraw to achieve reconciliation.   
 Fourthly, with regard to a case that is tossed back and forth, 
the Amendment makes special provisions for the purpose of closing 
the case and settling the dispute.  When the cases involve 
administrative licensing, registration, expropriation, or agency’s 
decision on civil disputes, the court shall, under the parties’ 
application for collectively resolving relevant civil disputes, 
adjudicate them together.  When a remanded case has been reheard 
by the trial court but a party appeals the decision, the court of 
second instance shall enter a judgment by itself and must not 
remand the case to the trial court for retrial a second time.   
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3. Measures to Solve “Difficulty in Executing Court Decisions” 
 To solving the difficulty to execute court decisions, the 
Amendment also makes a fierce prescription.  At first, for any 
agency that should make the payment but does not perform it, the 
court shall inform the bank to transfer the money from the agency’s 
bank account.  Before this Amendment, the Law did not mention 
compensation.  Second, if an agency fails to perform its duties 
within the prescribed time limit, the agency leader shall be imposed 
a fine of 50-100 yuan a day.  Before this Amendment, the court may 
only impose a fine on the agency.  This revision is more 
accommodating in theory and will be more viable in practice.  
Third, if an agency refuses to perform the court’s judgment, ruling 
or mediation agreement, resulting in adverse impact in society, the 
court shall deem the agency’s executive staff and other staff directly 
liable; if the circumstances are serious enough to constitute a crime, 
the court shall transfer the case to the people’s procuratorate for 
prosecution.  This provision conveys a very clear message: 
administrative officials must take the court decision seriously.  
When the Amendment of the Law was promulgated, a newspaper 
created a banner headline to discuss this provision.33  Fourth, the 
court may make a public announcement on an agency’s refusal to 
enforce the court decision and put forward judicial 
recommendations to relevant departments.  This seemingly mild 
approach is probably more helpful under the Chinese system in 
urging agencies to perform their obligations.  Overall, it should be 
uncommon that an agency shall avowedly refuses to perform a court 
decision in the future. 
 
B. Provisions with Chinese Characteristics 
 Legislators have also established, in the course of amending 
the Law, some rules with strong Chinese characteristics to 
                                                             
33 Sun Qian (孙乾), Xingzheng Jiguan Bulvxing Panjue Ke Ju Fuzeren (行政机
关拒不履行判决可拘负责人) [Responsible Official Shall be Detained if 
Administrative Organ Refuses to Perform Court Decision], SOHUNEWS (NOV. 2, 
2014)  [https://perma.cc/HD96-883T]. 
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accommodate the current Chinese political system and social 
perceptions.  First of all, the leader of an agency is required to 
appear in court.  Secondly, reconsideration organ is demanded to be 
the defendant.  These rules are controversial even in China.  The 
practical effects of these practices remain to be seen.   
 
1. The Leader of an Agency Appears in Court 
 Long before the Law was amended, the practice that the 
leader of an agency appears in court was already the norm in some 
areas.  A State Council’s document has included it as a measure to 
“strengthen the construction of a government ruled by law.”34  
Those who favor this provision believe that the agency leader 
appearing in court will help ease the antagonism between the two 
parties in the litigation, settle the administrative dispute 
appropriately, enhance the agency leader’s sense to conduct 
administration in accordance with law, and identify and solve the 
problems of administrative enforcement of law.  In a certain sense, 
this practice also symbolizes agencies’ respect for the judiciary and 
for the rule of law.  Opponents argue that agency leader appearing in 
court is a mere formality, does not solve practical problems and may 
even cause unnecessary stress and troubles to the court. 35   
 The Second Draft once provided that “the leader of the 
defendant agency should appear in court.  If the leader cannot 
                                                             
34 Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe de Yijian (国务院关于
加强法治政府建设的意见) [Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the 
Construction of Government Ruled by Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, 
Oct. 10, 2010, effective Oct. 10, 2010). 
35 See Lv Shang Min (吕尚敏), Xingzhengshouzhang Yingdang Chuting Yingsu 
ma?Zai Sifa de Jishu, Quanneng Yu Gongneng Zhijian (行政首长应当出庭应诉
吗？在司法的技术、权能与功能之间), [Should the Chief Executive Appear in 
Court? In Between the Judicial Technology, Power and Function], 17 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 98 (2009) (discussing the ramification of administrative organ’s chief 
officials appearing in court); Zhang Zhi Yuan (章志远), Xingzheng Susong Zhong 
de Xingzheng Shouzhang Chuting Yingsu Zhidu Yanjiu (行政诉讼中的行政首长
出庭应诉制度研究), [Study on the Rule of Chief Executive Appearing in Court 
in Administrative Litigations] 34 L. SCI. MAG. 94 (2013) (discussing the rules 
and procedures of administrative organ’s chief officials appearing in court). 
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appear in court, he or she may also entrust an appropriate employee 
to appear in court.”  Some NPC deputies were not satisfied, arguing 
that the language of the draft providing that the leader “may also 
entrust” other employees to appear in court does not have binding 
force to the agency leader.  In the last deliberation, the language 
“may also” was then changed to “should.”  Thus, after some 
revision, article 3.3 reads “the leader of an agency against which the 
complaint is filed shall appear in court to respond to the complaint.  
If the leader is unable to appear in court, a relevant employee of the 
agency shall appear in court.”   
 In Chinese law, “agency leader” includes the agency head 
and deputy head of the agency.  The provision “shall appear in court 
to respond to the complaint” looks more like a manifesto.  This 
provision, in practice, needs to rely on the internal regulation and 
evaluation of the agency for enforcement.  Whether the leader of an 
agency shall appear in court depends to a large extent on the work 
schedules and caseloads of the agency.  The court may advise the 
leader of an agency to appear in court in particular cases, but 
generally speaking the court shall not force the agency leader to 
appear in court, demand an agency to explain why its leader is 
unable to appear in court, or investigate whether the reasons are 
tenable.  In short, an agency must entrust a relevant employee, 
instead of merely entrusting an attorney outside the agency, to 
appear in court when its leader is unable to appear in court.  The 
amended law also allows, in addition to the agency leader appearing 
in court, an agency to entrust one or two legal representatives to 
appear in court at the same time.   
 On April 11, 2016, almost one year after the amended Law 
came into effect, Chen Minming (陈鸣明), vice-governor of 
Guizhou Province appeared in a court session. Minming became the 
first high official appearing in court to defend an agency action in 
the Chinese history of administrative litigation.  This case was 
widely covered by the media.36 
                                                             
36 Jia Shi Yu (贾世煜), Fu Shengzhang Chuting Yingsu “Min Gao Guan” 
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2. Reconsideration Organ Demanded to be the Defendant 
 This provision may be the most controversial provision in 
this Amendment.  Yet it also has the most remarkable and far-
reaching impact.  
In addition to administrative litigation, there are various internal 
relief channels in the Chinese administrative system.  A party may, 
in principle, apply to the agency of the next higher level for 
reconsideration if he or she disagrees with the decision made by an 
agency.  If the decision is made by a department of a local 
government, the party may apply to the local government for 
reconsideration.  The Legal Affairs Office of a reconsideration organ 
is the one that undertakes the duty of reconsideration, even though 
the decision is made in the name of the reconsideration organ.  A 
party may, in general, file a case to the court if he or she does not 
accept the decision after reconsideration. 
 In theory, administrative reconsideration should become the 
main channel of solving administrative disputes due to its simple 
procedure and low cost.  However, in reality, this channel has 
achieved suboptimal effect.  First of all, reconsideration organs have 
only handled a small number of cases, the number being even 
smaller than that of litigation cases.  Administrative reconsideration 
cases would be even fewer but for the provisions of some laws or 
regulations that there must be reconsideration before administrative 
litigation.  Moreover, the percentage of reconsideration decisions in 
favor of the applicants (including revocation, modification, ordered 
performance or confirmed illegality of administrative action) has 
dropped from thirty percent, before the enforcement of the 
Administrative Reconsideration Law, to less than ten percent in 
recent years.37  On the other hand, the percentage in favor of 
                                                                                                                                           
Qianhou (副省长出庭应诉“民告官”前后) [Before and After the Vice-
Governor Appearing in Court] BEIJING NEWS (April 18, 2016), 
http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2016/04/18/400436.html 
[https://perma.cc/7R2A-65BU]. 
37 The statistic here and the ones on administrative reconsideration below 
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agencies has increased to a sustained value of sixty percent.  
Reconsideration organs thus received the notorious nickname of 
“sustaining agency.”  The low percentage of reconsideration 
decisions in favor of the applicants in turn dampened the people’s 
confidence in the system’s effectiveness and hindered them from 
seeking reconsideration.   
 There are many reasons for the insufficient effects of 
administrative reconsideration, but one provision of the Law can 
hardly absolve itself from the blame.  According to that provision, 
which agency shall be the defendant when an applicant does not 
accept the reconsideration decision and files in the court depends on 
the reconsideration organ’s decision on the dispute.  Should it 
decide to sustain the original administrative action, the 
reconsideration organ shall not be the defendant.  On the other hand, 
when it decides to modify the original administrative action, it shall 
be the defendant.   
In practice, a reconsideration organ that decides to modify the 
original administrative action often falls between two stools because 
it will not only offend its counterpart that has decided the 
administrative action, but also poke up the third party and act as the 
defendant.  Being the defendant will incur a substantial cost and, in 
the current official evaluation system, a risk of demerits in the 
evaluation.  Hence, reconsideration organs try to sustain 
administration actions to avoid troubles.  The unusually high 
proportion of reconsideration decisions that sustain the original 
administrative actions can be attributed as an effect of the aforesaid 
provision.   
 There are two ways to get rid of this predicaments: one is to 
stipulate that no reconsideration organ shall be a defendant, and the 
other is to stipulate that all reconsideration organs shall be named as 
defendants.  Those who argue for the former state that 
reconsideration organs are the presiding judges over the dispute, and 
                                                                                                                                           
have been provided by the State Council Legal Affairs Office. See 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/col/col28/index.html. 
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it is a common practice across nations that a judge cannot be a 
defendant.  Once they are required to be defendants, reconsideration 
organs will have a great burden of court appearance, and disputes 
will not be effectively solved in the end.  Those who argue 
otherwise state that administrative reconsideration is an internal 
procedure for supervision and error correction within the 
administrative system, and as part of the administrative system, the 
reconsideration organ should assume administrative responsibilities.  
In the Chinese system, is making reconsideration organs defendants 
the only way to compel them to take on responsibilities?  Scholars 
are divided. Government legal affairs departments unanimously 
oppose the idea of making reconsideration organs defendants, while 
the masses and NPC deputies scream for making reconsideration 
organs defendants, and courts also believe that making 
reconsideration organs defendants will help settle disputes.    
 The Amendment of the Law made a decision on this issue 
that a reconsideration organ shall be defendant regardless of 
whether it decides to sustain or modify the original administrative 
actions.  The Amendment stipulates that the reconsideration organ 
and the agency of the original administrative action shall be co-
defendants if a reconsideration organ decides to sustain the original 
administrative action.  The design of this rule has caused many 
complex technical problems, including but not limited to court 
jurisdiction, defendant’s response, and way of judgment.  The effect 
of implementation shall be discussed afterwards.   
 
C. Unachieved Proposals for Amendment  
 Although the legislature has made a lot of efforts many 
problems remain unresolved, much to the disappointment of some 
judges, scholars and the public.  These unfinished tasks include 
expanding the scope of actionable cases, establishing public interest 
litigation, defining review power over regulations, and adjusting the 
judicial system.  The general goal of the legislature is to solve the 
most pressing problems of administrative trials instead of simply 
expanding the function of administrative litigation in state 
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governance.   
 
1. Rather Limited Expansion of Actionable Cases 
 The Amendment has made some efforts to expand the scope 
of administrative cases.  Firstly, it has added several types of 
actionable cases to the original eight stipulations, expanding the 
scope to twelve stipulations.  One breakthrough is to bring agency’s 
contract action into the scope of administrative cases.  Secondly, as 
the fallback provision of the circumstances listed above indicates, 
the rights to be protected have been expanded from personal right 
and property right to other lawful rights and interests.  Thirdly, the 
administrative actions taken by an organization that is empowered 
by law, regulation or rule has also been brought, by way of 
describing the concept of administrative actions, into the adjustment 
scope of law and scope of actionable cases by the court.  These 
stipulations have provided space for future extension of the scope of 
administrative litigation.  
 However, provisions on the scope of cases still follow the 
mode originally listed and the clause concerning the cases that the 
court shall not accept remains untouched.  Firstly, the agency’s 
normative documents remain outside the scope of actionable cases.  
Courts can only indirectly review related normative documents, 
while reviewing the legality of specific administrative actions.  
Courts may rule in a particular case that the related normative 
document does not apply but may not declare it unlawful and void.  
Secondly, the justiciability of management actions such as 
recruitment, dismissal, and discharge of civil servants are not 
affirmed.  Thus, civil servant management cases are still exempt 
from lawsuits.  Thirdly, the justiciability of some new types of rights 
such as the right to work, the right to education and the right to a 
healthy environment remains to be interpreted.  Compared with the 
original judicial interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court, the 
scope of actionable cases of administrative litigation is not 
substantially expanded in the aspect of legal norms.  
 All the above shows that the principle of rule of law that “all 
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legal disputes may be settled at court” has not been recognized.  In 
reality, the statement on administrative litigation in the decision of 
the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee also 
places more emphasis on the solution of “difficulties in getting an 
administrative lawsuit registered, adjudicating administrative cases, 
and executing court decisions,” instead of fully acknowledging the 
importance of administrative litigation in a government ruled by 
law.  The public still cannot expect much from the administrative 
litigation function.   
 
2. Public Interest Administrative Litigation Still Missing 
 Public interest administrative litigation should have been an 
extension of the functions to facilitate administrative litigation, 
helping to supervise agencies, maintain the public law and order, 
and transform administrative litigation into a public forum for 
promoting institutional changes.  The academics have vigorously 
called for public interest efforts in administrative litigation.  Some 
scholars have suggested, albeit in vain, that social organizations be 
the ones to initiate public interest administrative litigations.  On the 
one hand, social organizations in China are still underdeveloped.  
On the other hand, the authorities have reservations about many 
social organizations and thus are doubtful about social 
organizations’ involvement in public interest litigation.   
 The Eighteenth CPC Central Committee mentioned in its 
decision adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session, “exploring the 
establishment of a public interest litigation system where the 
people’s procuratorate initiates the legal proceedings.”38  Although 
the procuratorate have great enthusiasm for this, the Government 
Legal Affairs Department expressly opposes the suggestion that the 
procuratorate acts as the plaintiff of administrative cases.  The Legal 
Affairs Office of the State Council points out that an agency itself is 
the representative of public interest.  Thus, it does not conform to 
the traditional system where the procuratorate initiates legal 
                                                             
38 Supra note 23. 
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proceedings against an agency in the court.39  Some scholars are 
also concerned about the actual effect of the procuratorate’s 
initiation of public interest litigations.  The current procuratorates of 
China, like the court, do not enjoy a guaranteed independence to 
exercise their power.  Even if the law empowers them to initiate 
public interest litigations, the procuratorates may not be able to 
initiate more than a few in years.  They will not be able to help 
much to establish a system as such.  Because there were too many 
differences on this issue, the Amendment did not endorse this 
suggestion and the problem is left for “further exploration” in 
practice.40   
 
3. The Power of Regulation Review Remains to be Defined 
 The legal system of China is highly complicated, which 
frustrates even domestic legal scholars and attorneys, not to mention 
foreign observers.  In simple terms, the National People’s Congress 
and its Standing Committee may enact laws, the State Council may 
enact administrative regulations, local People’s Congress and its 
Standing Committee of relatively higher status may enact local 
regulations, and State Council departments and local governments 
of relatively higher status may enact administrative rules.  Among 
these forms, the force of laws is higher than that of administrative 
and local regulations, and the force of administrative and local 
regulations is, roughly speaking, higher than that of rules.  It is 
completely out of the question in China for courts to review the 
constitutionality of laws, while it has been legally affirmed that 
courts have the power to review collaterally the legality of rules and 
determine their application.  At present, a difficult problem is the 
                                                             
39 Qiao Xiaoyang (乔晓阳), Oct. 31, 2014, supra note 30. 
40 On May 1, 2015, after the Administrative Litigation Law Amendment was 
promulgated, the Standing Committee of the NPC authorized the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate to conduct a two-year Public Interest Litigation Pilot 
Program in the fields of ecological environment, resources preservation, state-
owned assets protection, assignment of the right to the use of state-owned land 
and food and drug safety.  Up to September 2016, the pilot Procuratorates filed 28 
litigations of such sort in total. 
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inconsistency between regulations (especially local regulations) and 
laws.  The law has not explicitly provided whether a court may 
exclude directly the application of inconsistent local regulations.  A 
judge once declared in the court decision that a provision of a local 
regulation was inconsistent with the law and should not apply, but 
that caused herself a lot of trouble.41  Along with the continuous 
delegation of legislative power, 282 cities nationwide with 
subordinate districts will be delegated the power to enact local 
regulations,42 which makes it more urgent for the judicial body to 
review local regulations.   
 However, there are different opinions on this issue.  The 
majority of scholars propose that the courts should have the power 
to independently decide on the application of a local regulation in 
adjudicating individual cases.  The opposite opinion is that under 
the Chinese system of the People’s Congress courts are accountable 
to the People’s Congress at the same level, by which judges are 
appointed and to which the court presidents shall report.  Therefore, 
courts cannot exclude on their own the application of a local 
regulation.  If in adjudication courts have any doubt about the 
legality of a local regulation, they may suspend the adjudication and 
refer it to a competent organ for judgment according to relevant 
provisions.  The Amendment evaded this controversy and inherited 
the original stipulation, that is, courts must “base” their judgment on 
the law, administrative regulation and local regulation.  
                                                             
41 Wang Hong (王宏), Fayuan Qike Feiyi Renda Fagui (法院岂可非议人大法
规：甘肃高院撤销酒泉中院一起错误判决) [How Could a Court Reproach the 
Regulation Enacted by the People’s Congress: Gansu Provincial Higher People’s 
Court Reversed the Wrong Decision by Jiuquan People’s Court], BEIJING YOUTH 
DAILY, Oct. 27, 2000; Tian Yi (田毅) & Wang Ying (王颖), Yige Faguan De 
Mingyun Yu Fatiao Dichu Zhi Bian (一个法官的命运与“法条抵触之辩) [A 
Judge’s Fate and “Debate on the Conflict of Legal Provisions”], 21st CENTURY 
ECON. REP., (Nov.17, 2003). 
42 Chen Liping (陈丽平)，Difang Lifa Quan Kuozhi 282 Ge Shequ De Shi (地
方立法权扩至282个设区的市)[282 Cities that are Divided into Districts to be 
Delegated Law-making Power], FAZHI RIBAO [Legal Daily], (Aug.26, 2014), 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zt/content/2014-
08/26/content_5733453.htm?node=71314  [https://perma.cc/Y6HJ-WXAU]. 
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Controversies over this issue may still occur in the future.   
 
4. Partial Adjustment to Administrative Adjudication System  
 Compared to the above improvement on administrative 
adjudication mechanisms, the reform on administrative adjudication 
system is probably of more decisive significance.  Administrative 
adjudication system decides what kind of judiciary shall adjudicate 
administrative cases.  Many people deemed it a top priority when 
amending the Law.  If the provision on this issue is not properly 
amended and judges do not have independence and authority, the 
Amendment of the Law will achieve a fraction of its intended 
effects, and some clauses will become mere decorations.   
 In the course of amending the Law, there have been various 
proposals, including one of establishing within the current court 
system administrative courts to specifically adjudicate 
administrative cases.43  The legislation finally retained the current 
system that there is an administrative division in people’s courts at 
all four levels but made a lot of minor adjustments.  The final 
revision combined various proposals.  The first is hierarchical 
jurisdiction.  This proposal says that any complaint brought against 
a county government shall be referred to the intermediate people’s 
                                                             
43 See generally Jiang Bixin (江必新), Zhongguo Xingzheng Shenpan Tizhi 
Gaige Yanjiu - Jianlun Woguo Xingzheng Fayuan Tixi Goujian De Jichu Yiju Ji 
Gouxiang (中国行政审判体制改革研究——兼论我国行政法院体系构建的基
础、依据及构想)[Research on China’s Administrative Adjudication System 
Reform — Currently on Foundation, Basis and Conception of China’s 
Administrative Court System Construction], 4 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU 
[Administrative Law Review] 3 (2013) (explaining the proposed changes to the 
court systems); Ma Huaide (马怀德), Xingzheng Shenpan Tizhi Gaige De 
Mubiao: Sheli Xingzheng Fayuan (行政审判体制改革的目标：设立行政法院) 
[The Aim of Administrative Adjudication System Reform Is to Establish 
Administrative Court], 7 FALV SHIYONG [Journal of Law Application] 8 (2013) 
(describing the projected benefits to the amendments to the court system through 
administrative changes); He Haibo (何海波), Xingzheng Shenpan Tizhi Gaige 
Chuyi (行政审判体制改革刍议) [On Reform of Administrative Adjudication 
System], 1 ZHONGGUO FALV PINGLUN [China Law Review] 63 (2014) (detailing 
the reforms of the administrative adjudication system, and the impacts of these 
decisions). 
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court.  A superior court may also hear a case under the lower court’s 
jurisdiction, but the superior court is forbidden to send a case in its 
jurisdiction to a lower court.  Then, a lower court may refer a case 
under its jurisdiction to a superior court for designating another 
court to hear the case.  This leaves open the possibility of cross-
regional jurisdiction.  Finally, the higher people’s court under the 
approval of the Supreme People’s Court may determine a number of 
courts to exercise cross-regional administrative jurisdiction over 
administrative cases.  This provides a basis for centralized 
jurisdiction and also leaves open the possibility of establishing 
special administrative courts.   
 The above provisions reflect the spirit of the Fourth Plenary 
Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee of moderate adjustment 
of the administrative lawsuit jurisdiction system.  It helps enhance 
the anti-interference capacity of administrative adjudication.  
However, because legislators have not made decisions on the 
judicial system, there is still much uncertainties left in terms of 
specific plan and many issues remain to be further explored in 
practice.  The overall advancement of judicial reform measures such 
as centralized management of the personnel, finance and materials 
of courts below the provincial level will also influence the trend of 
the reform of administrative adjudication system.   
 
IV. PRELIMINARY EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENT 
 
 It has been more than two years since the amended 
Administrative Litigation Law came into effect in May 2015.  Now, 
we can make a preliminary evaluation on the effect of the 
Amendment. 
 There are different perspectives on the effects of the 
amended Administrative Litigation Law.  From the perspective of 
institutional improvement, I would like to list three indicators: (1) 
whether the amended law can effectively solve the difficulty in 
getting an administrative lawsuit registered and make administrative 
cases increase by a large margin, (2) whether it can effectively solve 
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the difficulty in winning an administrative case and make the 
plaintiff’s winning rate rise significantly, and (3) whether it can 
improve the relevant mechanism of administrative dispute 
resolution and make administrative reconsideration cases increase 
and petition cases decrease.44   
 Statistics by the Supreme People’s Court, the Legal Affairs 
Office of the State Council and the State Bureau for Letters and 
Visits on the situation of administrative litigation, administrative 
reconsideration and petitions nationwide in 2015 and 2016 provide 
an answer to the above questions.  It should be noted that the new 
Administrative Litigation Law has not been in effect long enough to 
fully reveal the effect of the new Law.  Nevertheless, the statistics 
can give us an idea of the effect. 
 
A. Administrative Cases Increased by a Large Margin, and 
“Difficulty in Getting an Administrative Lawsuit 
Registered” Greatly Alleviated  
 
 There were 220,398 pieces of first instance administrative 
cases in 2015, an increase of fifty-five percent compared to 2014 
and the number leveled off at 225,485 in 2016.  This is the biggest 
increase following the overall implementation of the Administrative 
Litigation Law in early 1990s.  Because the scope of actionable 
cases has not been largely extended in this Amendment, which had 
limited influence on the increase of cases accepted, the increase in 
the number has obviously resulted from the implementation of the 
registration system.  According to report, in the month the 
registration system was first implemented, first instance 
administrative cases that were accepted nationwide attained a 
growth of 221 percent compared with the same period of the 
previous year, and 90 percent complaints were registered on the 
                                                             
44 He Haibo (何海波), Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiugai Zhihou De Xuannian 
(《行政诉讼法》修改之后的悬念) [Suspense after the Administrative Litigation 
Law Amendment], 12 CHINA REFORM, (2014).  
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spot.45  Although court’s refusal to register a case or issue a ruling is 
still heard occasionally, the difficulty in getting an administrative 
case registered has been greatly alleviated.  In the meantime, the 
case number of second instance continuously increased to more than 
ten thousand in 2016, an all time high in its history.   
 The surge of administrative cases in quantity will provide 
new opportunities for lawyers.  Trial lawyers of administrative 
litigation (including government lawyers) are at the threshold of a 
new period in development.  However, it has brought tremendous 
pressure to courts’ adjudication and administrative response in the 
short term.  From January to September 2016, the Supreme People’s 
Court received more than 2,000 new administrative cases, which is 
unprecedented.46  The cases suing the State Administration of 
Taxation and the Housing and Construction Department exceeded 
500 respectively.  The legislative affairs officers of the departments 
of the State Council are busying flying around the county to respond 
to lawsuits.  Because it is difficult to immediately recruit in-staff 
personnel, the judges and government legal staff in position 
suddenly faced a greatly increased burden.  
 
Figure 1: Number of Administrative Cases Accepted and Heard over 
the Years 
                                                             
45 Luo Shuzhen (罗书臻), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Tongbao Shishi Li’an 
Dengji Zhi Gaige Shouyue: Qingkuang Li’an Shu Chao Baiwan, Dangchang 
Li’an Lv Da 9 Cheng (最高人民法院通报实施立案登记制改革首月情况：立
案数超百万，当场立案率达９成) [The Supreme People’s Court Announced 
the First-month Implementation of the Amended Case Registration System: 
Number of Cases Registered Reached over a Million and 90% Registered on the 
Spot], RENMIN FAYUANBAO [People’s Court Daily] (Jun. 10, 2015), 
http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2015-06/10/content_98797.htm?div=-1 
[https://perma.cc/V38W-LPBH]. 
46 Zhang Wei (张维), Zuigao Fa Shouli Hang Su An Jinnian Jiang Chao 
Sanqian Jian (最高法受理行诉案今年将超三千件) [The Supreme People’s 
Court Will Accept and Hear More Than 3000 Pieces of Administrative Cases This 
Year], FAZHI RIBAO [Legal Daily] (Oct. 17 2016), 
http://epaper.legaldaily.com.cn/fzrb/content/20161017/Articel06002GN.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WDS8-QDNJ]. 
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 It is not clear how many disputes and what disputes should 
have been settled in courts but failed to enter court proceedings.  It 
is not entirely clear at present what administrative management 
areas the newly accepted cases mainly concern and what the 
administrative actions in questions are.  These issues require 
specific research.  The statistics over the years show that public 
security cases once occupied the first place but declined later to the 
third place.  Cases involving urban construction and natural 
resources have been the two most prevalent types of lawsuits for ten 
years consecutively, accounting for around 30 percent of the total 
number (see Fig. 2).  House demolition and land expropriation have 
become social disputes of great contention. The courts are actively 
engaged in settling the hot disputes.   
 
Figure 2: Proportion of Administrative Lawsuits in Several Major 
Areas of Administrative Management 
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 Among the types of administrative actions, administrative 
penalty is still the first category, but the proportion of cases 
involving administrative penalty has been declining continuously in 
recent years and dropped to below nine percent in 2016.  It is worth 
noting that several types of traditional administrative actions 
(including administrative penalty, administrative licensing, 
administrative adjudication, administrative coercive measures, 
administrative inaction, administrative compensation) altogether 
account for less than thirty percent (see Figure 3).  It is worth 
studying what the “other” cases refer to.  
 
Figure 3: Proportion of Administrative Lawsuits Involving Several 
Major Types of Administrative Actions 
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 The Case Registration System has brought some new 
problems while solving the difficulty in getting an administrative 
lawsuit registered.  A small number of citizens filed a large number 
of complaints, which included many trivial, repetitive, and 
practically meaningless ones.  For instance, a party filed, in order to 
get more compensation for house demolition, hundreds of 
complaints on government information disclosure to force the 
government to participate in negotiation.  We cannot identify the 
proportion of litigation abuse from the statistics, but many courts are 
deeply bothered by it.  These lawsuits have taken up too much of the 
judicial resources while unable to solve practical problems.  Courts 
have begun to limit such lawsuits, and their initiative has been 
recognized by the Supreme People’s Court.47   
                                                             
47 Nantong Gangzha Fayuan Guizhi Lanyong Suquan An Yishen Caiding Shu 
(南通港闸法院规制滥用诉权案一审裁定书) [First Written Verdict on 
Regulation of Abusing Litigation Right by Gangzha Dist. People’s Ct., Nantong 
City, Jiangsu Province] (Mar. 11, 2015),2015 Gang Xing Chu Zi Di 21 Hao (港行
初字第21号) ; Wang Xiaoyan (王小燕),  Nantong Gangzha Fayuan Shuaixian 
Guizhi Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Lansu Xingwei (南通港闸法院率先规制政府信
息公开滥诉行为)  [Gangzha People’s Court of Nantong City Takes the Lead in 
Regulating Abuse Action on Government Information Disclosure], Jiangsu 
Province High People’s Court, 
http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/art/2015/02/27/23_88908.html; Lu Hongxia Su Nantong 
Shi Fazhan He Gaige Weiyuanhui Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Dafu An (陆红霞诉南
通市发展和改革委员会政府信息公开答复案)[Lu Hongxia v. Nantong 
Development and Reform Commission, Response to Governmental Information 
Disclosure Case], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Issue. 11, 2015.  
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B. Plaintiff Winning Rate Rose Slightly, but “Difficulty in 
Adjudicating Administrative Cases” Still to Be Improved 
 The implementation of Case Registration System has 
brought the difficult task of solving administrative disputes into the 
courtroom.  How the court will deal with the incoming disputes is 
the biggest suspense.  In the past, courts usually persuaded plaintiffs 
to withdraw or flatly rejected complaints due to the excessive 
caseloads.  Meanwhile, plaintiff’s winning rates sometimes declined 
rather than rose.  In this regard, courts have done well in the past 
year.   
 Plaintiffs’ withdrawal rate has dropped sharply.  Plaintiff 
withdrawals used to be the most common way to close cases, 
exceeding even court judgments.  Plaintiffs’ withdrawal rate 
experienced two radical changes in the past thirty years, and the 
highest was respectively fifty-seven percent in 1997, and fifty 
percent in 2012; accordingly, cases that were closed in ways other 
than court judgments reached more than seventy percent at one 
time.  The high withdrawal rate reflects courts’ difficulty in 
adjudicating administrative cases.  Along with the adjustment of 
judicial policy, plaintiffs’ withdrawal rate kept declining in the last 
three years, and even reached twenty percent in 2016, the lowest 
since the implementation of the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law 
(see Figure 4).  Moreover, the rate of plaintiffs’ withdrawal after the 
defendant agency modified the administrative action in question, 
which may be regarded as if the plaintiff actually won the case, has 
also risen somewhat (see Figure 5).   
 
Figure 4 Proportion of Non-decision including Plaintiff Withdrawal, 
Dismissal and Transferal 
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Figure 5: Proportion of Plaintiff Withdrawal after the Defendant 
Agency Modifies the Alleged Administrative Action 
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percent.  It has risen slightly in the recent two years, and reached 
13.4 percent in 2016 (see Figure 6).  This indicates that the amended 
Administrative Litigation Law has played a positive role in 
protecting citizens’ rights.  We are not sure, however, how many 
plaintiffs out of plaintiff’s winning cases have received substantive 
relief, and whether those disputes have been solved meaningfully.  
Even on the surface of the cases, there is still room for the plaintiff 
winning rate to rise further in the future, referring to the 
aforementioned experience of Zhejiang Taizhou and Henan 
Province.   
 
Figure 6: Proportion of First Instance Case Decisions in Favor of 
Plaintiff and Defendant 
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decisions to reject the complaint, the proportion of court rulings to 
dismiss the lawsuit is still higher.  Courts only ruled to reject 10,343 
complaints in 2016, which was equal to one-fifth of the cases 
dismissed after acceptance.  It is necessary for the court to improve 
case registration in the future and rule to reject complaints at the 
very beginning that obviously do not meet the conditions for 
acceptance, including complaints that clearly indicate litigation 
abuse.  Rejection at the very beginning is more cost-efficient than 
dismissal afterwards.  The public needs to accept the fact that the 
Case Registration System does not need to accept all complaints.   
 
C. Administrative Reconsideration Achieves Better Effect but 
the “Main Chanel” Role has not been Brought into Full Play 
 Administrative dispute settlement is a big category and 
dispute settlement mechanisms—administrative litigation, 
administrative reconsideration and petition—should be reasonably 
allocated.  Administrative reconsideration should, for reasons of 
simplicity, speed, and cost, accept and solve in theory the majority 
of administrative disputes and become the main channel of 
administrative dispute settlement.  For the reason of its strictness 
and authority in fact-finding, law application, and implementation 
procedure, administrative litigation should become the last relief.  
Petition, an informal and complementary channel of dispute 
settlement, should be limited to a small number of administrative 
disputes.  An ideal ratio of administrative reconsideration to 
administrative litigation to petition should be, roughly speaking, 
100:10:1; but it has been quite the opposite in reality.   
 The poor effect of administrative reconsideration mainly 
attributes to its system, but as aforementioned, the following 
provision of the Law was also problematic: if the reconsideration 
organ decides to sustain the original administrative action, the party 
concerned may only sue the original agency that has taken the 
administrative action in question.  If the reconsideration organ 
decides to modify the original administrative action, the 
reconsideration organ shall be the defendant.  Then, the amended 
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Administrative Litigation Law will provide whether the 
reconsideration organ should decide to sustain or modify the 
original administrative action, in which the reconsideration organ 
would be the defendant.  There has been much controversy over the 
above provision in the academic circle.   
 The statistics of the year 2015 and 2016 show positive 
responses to the above provision by the reconsideration organ.  At 
first, the long-term increase of reconsideration decision to sustain 
the original administrative action, including dismissal of application 
for administrative reconsideration, stopped and visibly declined for 
the first time.  In addition, the number of reconsideration decisions 
in favor of applicants stopped declining over the years, attained 16.8 
percent in 2016, which was the highest in a decade, doubling that of 
the year prior to the amendment (see Figure 7).  In the meantime, 
administrative reconsideration cases continued to grow, reaching 
close to 164,000 pieces in 2016 (see Figure 8).  The provision that 
the reconsideration organ shall be the defendant has promoted the 
conscientious fulfillment of its reconsideration duties and the duties 
to protect of citizens’ rights.  It may also induce future reform of the 
administrative reconsideration system and amendment of the 
Administrative Reconsideration Law.  It will take some time to see 
what the effects will be. 
 
Figure 7: Closure of Administrative Reconsideration Cases 
Nationwide Over the Years 
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Figure 8: Number of Administrative Reconsideration Cases 
Nationwide Over the Years 
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petitions also declined.48  In 2016, petitions nationwide declined 
again, slightly but steadily.49  We cannot simply attribute the decline 
of petitions to the improvement of administrative litigation and 
administrative reconsideration systems.  However, considering that 
the vast majority of petitioned matters relate to agencies, the 
unimpeded channels mentioned above have indeed played a role in 
the decrease in petitions.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The 2014 Amendment of the Administrative Litigation Law 
has made a powerful response to the difficulties in getting an 
administrative lawsuit registered, adjudicating administrative cases 
and executing court decisions.  After the amended Administrative 
Litigation Law came into effect, the acceptance of first instance 
administrative lawsuits increased sharply, and the plaintiffs’ winning 
rate also rose in the same time.  The function of administrative 
litigation has been improved in settling disputes, which has 
promoted the reform of the administrative reconsideration and 
petition mechanisms.  In general, the Amendment of the 
Administrative Litigation Law has achieved the results of that 
legislators desired and administrative litigation in China is 
embracing the best ever period in its history.   
 The initial target of this Amendment is very humble.  The 
Amendment has aimed to solve the “three difficulties,” and thus it 
has not prioritized expanding the functions of administrative 
                                                             
48 Bai Yang (白阳), Guojia Xinfang Ju: 2015 Nian Quanguo Xinfang 
Zengliang Cunliang Shixian “Shuang Xiajiang” (国家信访局：2015年全国信
访增量存量实现“双下降”) [State Bureau for Letters and Visits: Increment and 
Stock of Petitions Nationwide in 2015 Both Declined], XINHUAWANG, (Jan. 24, 
2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-01/24/c_1117876355.htm 
[https://perma.cc/SAR7-LM2D]. 
49 Lu Junyu (卢俊宇), Qunian Quanguo Xinfang Zongliang Tongbi Xiajiang 
1.2% (去年全国信访总量同比下降1.2%)  [Petitions Nationwide Declined by 
1.2% Compared with the Year Before], XINHUA NET, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2017-01/16/c_129448119.htm 
[https://perma.cc/M6TB-EBFR].  
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litigation.  Court reviews of normative documents, collateral 
reviews of local regulations, and acceptance of public interest 
litigation were not implemented.  The biggest problem that has 
restricted administrative litigation, namely a full guarantee of the 
independence and authority of administrative trial, has not been 
solved by the Amendment.  Solving this problem will require an 
overall advancement of judicial and political reform.  The deep-
seated problems that have troubled administrative litigation for 
years still exist.  Administrative trial still faces a difficult future.   
 Compared to administrative law enforcement and judicial 
practices, legislation is the key factor and major symbol of legal 
development.  The Amendment of the Administrative Litigation 
Law reflects the efforts to promote the rule of law in this era, as well 
as the limitations to the process of law at this stage.  If there is a gap 
between the law and our expectations, it is because there is a gap 
between the times we are in and the future we look forward to.  We 
appeal and criticize because we cherish such an ideal.   
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